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ARTICLE
WELFARE, PRIVACY, AND FEMINISM

By: Michele Estrin Gilman·
The whole system is based on the assumption that you are trying to
screw [welfare officials] over. There are constant check-ins and
impossibly long lists of 'verifications' to submit to the state in order to
back your story; inquisitions involving a battery of questions asked by
countless supervisors behind closed doors when it appears that your
story does not add up . .. [and] if you don't comply. .. your benefits
can be cut.
- Maria Cristina Rangel, former welfare mother and third-wave
l
feminist.

P

rivacy rights are in the headlines. In the wake of technological
advances and post 9/11 surveillance tactics, Americans are
debating the tensions between civil liberties and security; between
internet consumerism and the marketing of personal data; and between
improved health care and protection of patient records. Feminists
have also long debated privacy and what it means for women.
Second-wave feminists focused primarily on two aspects of privacy.
First, they assailed the patriarchal divide between the public and the
private spheres that trapped women in the home and subjected them to
domestic abuse. Second, feminists argued in favor of a sphere of
privacy that would allow women to make reproductive choices
without state interference. These were powerful critiques of existing
power structures. Through political action and legal challenges,
women made significant advances in gaining decisional privacy while
shedding unwanted physical privacy.
Women entered new
workplaces. Domestic abuse was criminalized. The Supreme Court
located a right to reproductive choice in the Constitution. Despite
• Associate Professor and Director, Civil Advocacy Clinic, University of Baltimore
School of Law. B.A. 1990, Duke University; J.D. 1993, University of Michigan Law School. I
would like to thank the participants in the Can You Hear Us Now? symposium for their
thoughtful comments on this essay.
1 Maria Cristina Rangel, Knowledge Is Power, in LISTEN UP: VOICES FROM THE NEXT
FEMINIST GENERAnON 188, 192 (Barbara Findlen ed., 2001).
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these advances, the second-wave critiques embodied a white, middleclass perspective and tended to overlook the experiences of poor
2
women.
As a historical matter, poor women have always had less privacy
than other women. To begin with, they often worked outside the
3
"sanctity" of the home, serving as a cheap form of labor. Further, the
government freely intruded into the homes of poor, single mothers,
4
often as a surrogate for the absent male. These intrusions continue
today. As a condition of receiving welfare benefits, poor women have
been subjected to drug tests, and they continue to face unannounced
home inspections by government officials, fingerprinting, and
restrictions on their reproductive choices. These formal welfare
requirements overlay routinized surveillance of poor women, who
must comply with extreme verification requirements to establish
eligibility, travel to scattered offices to procure needed approvals,
reappear in person at welfare offices at regular intervals to prove their
ongoing eligibility and answer intrusive questions about their child
rearing and intimate relationships. Thus, while many Americans are
uneasy about their privacy in a time of technological transformation,
the harms poor women face from privacy deprivations go far beyond
5
unease.
This essay discusses the relationship between feminist critiques of
privacy and poor women. It explores how second-wave feminism
considered privacy as experienced by poor women, and it analyzes
whether third-wave feminism is up to the task of better securing
6
privacy rights for poor women. Part I describes how the welfare
system strips poor women of privacy and the harms they suffer as a
result. Part II explains how the legal system shapes and defines the
2 See MIMI ABRAMOVITZ, REGULATING THE LIVES OF WOMEN: SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY
FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 29 (lst ed. 1988) ("To generalize from the lives of
middle-class, native-born, white women to other groups of women as ifno differences existed,
creates distortions .... ").
3 See id.
4 Id. at 313.
5 Cj Ann Bartow, Response, A Feeling afUnease About Privacy Law, 155 U. PA. L. REv.
PENNuMBRA 52, 52 (2006), http://www.pennumbra.comlresponses/11-2006IBartow.pdf
(criticizing a leading privacy theorist for failing to show how "privacy violations can
negatively impact the lives of living, breathing human beings beyond simply provoking
feelings of unease.").
6 Second-wave feminism is associated with the movement for equal rights for women
during the 1960s and 1970s; while third-wave feminism is associated with women "who came
into a political consciousness in the 1980s and 1990s." See Bridget J. Crawford, Toward a
Third-Wave Feminist Legal Theory: Young Women, Pornography and the Praxis of Pleasure,
14 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 99, 108 (2007). The theoretical differences between the movements
are discussed in Part Ill.
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privacy rights of poor women. Part III discusses second-wave and
third-wave feminist perspectives on privacy and how those theoretical
positions relate to welfare mothers. The Conclusion suggests a
feminist advocacy strategy that would include the voices of poor
women within a conception of privacy that respects the dignity of poor
women while providing them with the support they need to care for
their families.
I.

WELFARE AND PRIVACY

The welfare system strips poor women of privacy not simply as a
necessary precondition for processing applications, but also to
reinforce the subjugation of the poor.7
The government has
historically sought to make public assistance so stingy and so
unappealing that few will bother to apply. 8 At the same time public
policy punishes women who do not fit the patriarchal norm of a
married, two-parent family with a male breadwinner. 9 Privacy
invasions are a primary tactic for stigmatizing welfare and single
motherhood. 10

A. Welfare History
Since this country's founding, the poor have been categorized as
either deserving, meaning they cannot be blamed for their poverty,
such as children, widows, and the disabled, or undeserving, meaning
they should be self-sufficient, such as able-bodied adults. II Single
7 Welfare applicants are an extremely diverse group of women with varied life
experiences. This essay does not intend to devalue the individuality of those whose lives are
impacted by the welfare system. Instead, this essay focuses on the shared experience of state
surveillance faced by welfare mothers.
8 See JOHN GILLlOM, OVERSEERS OF THE POOR: SURVEILLANCE, RESISTANCE, AND THE
LIMITS OF PRIVACY 23 (2001); see also LINDA GORDON, PITIED BUT NOT ENTITLED, SINGLE
MOTHERS AND THE HISTORY OF WELFARE 49 (1994).
9 See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND
OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 106-10 (1995).
10 See Amy Mulzer, Note, The Doorkeeper and the Grand Inquisitor: The Central Role of
Verification Procedures in Means-Tested Welfare Programs, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv.
663, 675 (2005) ("Some state and local agencies are using verification procedures to
stigmatize and embarrass claimants ....").
II See generally MICHAEL B. KATZ, THE UNDESERVING POOR: FROM THE WAR ON POVERTY
TO THE WAR ON WELFARE 8 (1989); Joel F. Handler, "Constructing the Political Spectacle":
The Interpretation of Entitlements, Legalization, and Obligations in Social Welfare History,
56 BROOK. L. REV. 899,906 (1990) ("[T]he heart of poverty policy centers on the question of
who is excused from work. Those who are excused are the 'deserving poor'; those who must
work are the 'undeserving.' Ultimately, this is a moral distinction."); Thomas Ross, The
Rhetoric of Poverty: Their Immorality, Our Helplessness, 79 GEO. L.J. 1499, 1505 (1991)
("[This] distinction created a line running through the poor, putting the aged, infant, and
disabled on one side of the line, and the able-bodied on the other side.").
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mothers of children have always occupied a shifting and uneasy space
between these two poles; white widows have received the most
sympathy, while unmarried women of color have been the targets of
approbation. 12 The modem welfare state arose out of the New Deal,
which treated relief for white men differently than relief for minorities
and women. 13 Social insurance programs designed for white working
men, such as social security and unemployment insurance, have
carried no stigma, provided generous benefits pursuant to objective
By contrast, cash
criteria, and been federally administered. 14
assistance programs for single mothers, primarily Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC), have been stingy, stigmatized, stateadministered, and discretionary. 15
From the 1950s to the 1970s, AFDC roles grew rapidly as women
of color obtained rights to welfare, family structures changed across
society, and economic dislocations disproportionately impacted
African-Americans. 16 A backlash against welfare mothers reached a
frenzy in the 1980s, as the media and policymakers portrayed welfare
mothers as lazy and promiscuous. President Reagan famously
attacked them as "welfare queens.,,17 In 1996, AFDC was replaced
with Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), largely due
to the public perception that AFDC was encouraging dependency in
welfare mothers and discouraging the formation of two-parent
families. Accordingly, TANF abolished the entitlement to welfare and
put a five-year lifetime limit on the receipt of welfare benefits. 18
Significantly, TANF requires that recipients work within two years of
receiving benefits, although most states impose a shorter timeframe.
Still, even though TANF recipients must now work in exchange for
welfare benefits, they continue to face the same sorts of stigma and
12 See Joel F. Handler, The Transformation of the Aid to Families with Dependent
Children: The Family Support Act in Historical Context, 16 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE,
457,473-78 (1987-88).
13 See GORDON, supra note 8, at 5-6, 293-99.
14 I d.
15 I d.
16 See MICHAEL B. KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF
WELFARE IN AMERICA 267 (1986); see also ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 2, at 319, 334.
17 See PREMILLA NADASEN, WELFARE WARRIORS: THE WELFARE RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN
THE UNITED STATES 194-99, 239-40 (2005) (describing the roots of the backlash); see also
WALTER I. TRATTNER, FROM POOR LAW TO WELFARE STATE: A HISTORY OF SOCIAL WELFARE
IN AMERICA 362-85 (6th ed. 1999) (describing political responses to perceived welfare crisis).
President Reagan's story about the "welfare queen" proved to be a myth. See Spencer
Overton, Voter Identification, 105 MICH. L. REv. 631, 645 (2007).
18 TANF was created by the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 604(a) (2000)).
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privacy deprivations that were rampant under AFDC, and the advent
of new technologies has only exacerbated the situation.

B. Privacy
When a woman applies for and receives TANF, she faces the loss
of informational, physical, and decisional privacy, each of which is
cons}'dered'In turn. 19
1. Informational Privacy. - Informational privacy concerns the
interest individuals have in controlling their personal data and limiting
access to such information by others. 20 Obviously, a government
program must ensure that the proper persons are receiving the
appropriate levels of benefits. Further, welfare caseworkers cannot
link welfare recipients to available social services without information
about their needs. However, the level of information required from
TANF applicants goes far beyond what is necessary to meet these
goals and is often gathered through demeaning techniques.
A typical TANF applicant must undergo a multi-stage, multi-day
application process consisting of screening interviews, application
21
interviews, group orientations, and employability assessments. She
must answer questions ranging from her resources and sustenance
22
needs to her psychological well-being. Her own word is not enough;
she must also provide independent verification of her answers to many
of these questions, either through her own documentation or through
information gathered from third parties,23 and in some cases,
caseworkers conduct investigations themselves. As part of TANF, an
applicant must also comply with child support enforcement efforts by
24
providing detailed paternity information about her children. All of
this information is electronically shared and compared with numerous
federal and state databases, as well as commercial databases, to verify
eligibility and to ferret out duplicate or otherwise fraudulent
19 These are the three major categories of privacy interests. See Jerry Kang, Information
Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1193,1202-03 (1998).
20 See DANIELJ. SOLOVE ET AL., PRIVACY, INFORMATION, AND TECHNOLOGY 1 (2006).
21 See PAMELA A. HOLCOMB ET AL., STUDY OF THE TANF ApPLICATION PROCESS E-3, 2-4,
3-3 (2003). available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/app-process03 [hereinafter Study of the TANF
Application Process]; PAMELA HOLCOMB, ET AL., THE APPLICATION PROCESS FOR TANF, FOOD
STAMPS, MEDICAID, AND SCHIP: ISSUES FOR AGENCIES AND APPLICANTS, INCLUDING
IMMIGRANTS AND LIMITED ENGLISH SPEAKERS 3-6 to 3-9 (2003), available at
http://www.urban.org!UploadedPDF/410640.pdf; MARCIA K. MEYERS & IRENE LURIE, THE
DECLINE IN WELFARE CASELOADS: AN ORGANIZATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 26 (2005), available at
http://www.npc.umich.edulnews/events/newdirectionslMeyers 1. pdf.
22 See Study of the TANF Application Process. supra note 21, at 3-7.
23 See MEYERS & LURIE, supra note 21, at 27; HOLCOMB ET AL., supra note 21, at 3-16.
2442 U.S.c. § 608(a)(2)-(3) (2000).

6

University of Baltimore Law Forum

[Vol. 39.1

25
applicants. After benefits are awarded, many jurisdictions monitor
how welfare recipients are spending their welfare funds through
. survel'11ance. 26
e1ectromc
2. Physical Privacy. - Physical privacy concerns the ability to
keep one's bodily integrity and home free from the intrusions of
27
others.
In the name of fraud prevention, many jurisdictions
fingerprint applicants and photograph them. 28 As part of child support
enforcement, TANF recipients must agree to DNA testing for
themselves and their children if paternity is contested. 29 Further,
several jurisdictions send investigators into the homes of welfare
applicants to verify eligibility information; investigators scour the
premises, including closets, medicine cabinets, and laundry baskets,
looking for proof of who lives in the home. 30
3. Decisional Privacy. - Decisional privacy is related to
autonomy; it preserves an individual's ability to make personal and
31
familial choices without external interference. TANF permits states
to invade the decisional privacy of welfare mothers in order to control
their behavior in line with middle-class norms. The most controversial
of these sexual regulation policies is the imposition of family caps;32
typically, family caps provide no cash benefit increases for any
children conceived while the mother is on welfare. 33 Several
25 See Allison I. Brown, Privacy Issues Affecting Welfare Applicants, 35 CLEARINGHOUSE
REv. 421, 427 (2001); see also Samuel V. Schoomaker IV, Consequences and Validity of
Family Law Provisions in the "Welfare Reform Act," 14 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 1, 10-21
(1997). Law enforcement agencies can obtain this administrative data by request, even if the
T ANF recipient is not the target of the criminal investigation. Kaaryn Gustafson, To Punish
the Poor: Criminalizing Trends in the Welfare System, WOMEN OF COLOR RESOURCE CENTER
WORKING PAPER No.3, 7 (2003).
26 See Christopher D. Cook, To Combat Welfare Fraud, States Reach for Debit Cards,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 25, 1999, at 5 (describing how states monitor purchases by
welfare recipients).
27 See Kang, supra note 19, at 1202.
28 See Nina Bernstein, Experts Doubt New York Plan To Fingerprintfor Medicaid, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 30, 2000, at Bl (listing states that fingerprint welfare recipients); see also
HOLCOMB ET AL., ISSUES FOR AGENCIES AND APPLICANTS, supra note 21, at 3-1 to 3-25
(Dallas, TX, and New York, NY use fingerprinting and photographing).
29 42 U.S.C. § 654(29)(C) (2000).
30 See Mulzer, supra note 10, at 675-77; San Diego v. Sanchez, 464 F.3d 916 (9th Cir.
2006) (upholding San Diego's conditioning of welfare benefits on consent to suspicionless
home visits).
31 See Kang, supra note 19, at 1202-03.
32 See Anna Marie Smith, The Sexual Regulation Dimension of Contemporary Welfare
Law: A Fifty State Overview, 8 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 121, 173-77 (2002). Slightly less than
half the states have adopted a family cap. Id. at 174.
33 See Rebekah J. Smith, Family Caps in Welfare Reform: Their Coercive Effects and
Damaging Consequences, 29 HARV. lL. & GENDER 151, 165-67 (2006). In states with the
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jurisdictions also offer "Norplant" bonuses, which cover the cost of
implanted, long-term contraceptive devices for welfare mothers,
sometimes with an additional cash award. 34 In addition, many states
bestow upon welfare mothers unsolicited family planning advice in the
form of counseling sessions, family planning classes, pamphlets, and
35
encouragement to give their children up for adoption.
C. Harms

Poor women suffer tangible harms - psychological, material, and
physical - as a result of the welfare system's intrusions into their
privacy. To begin with, the system of surveillance causes welfare
recipients to suffer psychological injuries including stress, fear, and
36
feelings of degradation. Studies have shown that poor women resist
welfare surveillance in subtle but widespread ways in order to care for
their families, such as by earning unreported income to supplement
37
meager welfare checks. While this resistance to surveillance defends
individual autonomy in the face of the state's power, it also causes
women even further stress due to the fear of getting caught and
possibly losing benefits or being punished criminally. 38
Moreover, the privacy deprivations associated with applying for
39
welfare discourage many needy women from seeking assistance.
Without state assistance, these non-entrants to the TANF system often
lack adequate resources for food, shelter, and other basic needs even if they are working. Studies have shown that non-entrants
struggle to make ends meet by juggling a shifting array of non-public

family cap, about nine percent of the case load has been impacted by the family cap policies,
resulting in about twenty percent less in cash assistance per family. Id. at 170-71.
34 See Rebekah Smith, supra note 33, at 168-69; see also Pamela D. Bridgewater,
Reproductive Freedom as Civil Freedom: The Thirteenth Amendment's Role in the Struggle
for Reproductive Rights, 3 GENDER RACE & JUST. 401,404-05 (2000) (Bridgewater argues
that the state's coercive use ofNorplant to hinder the reproductive rights of African-American
women violates the Thirteenth Amendment).
35 See Anna Marie Smith, supra note 32, at 169, 177-81.
36 See GILLIOM, supra note 8, at 66-67, 78, (summarizing interviews with welfare
recipients in Appalachia in the early 1990s).
37 See GILLIOM, supra note 8, at 99-106, 113.
38 See GILLIOM, supra note 8, at 87-88.
39 See Robert Moffitt, et ai., A Study ofTANF Non-Entrants, Final Report to the Office of
the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, Department of Health and Human
Services, Nov. 14, 2003, at 2, 14 (new welfare reform policies discourage participation). Id.
at 19-20 ("Most non-entrants in our study felt that applying for TANF was an unpleasant,
time-consuming experience that resulted in little financial benefit . . .. Many felt the
application process to be overly intrusive.").
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resources and that this hardship negatively impacts their health and
40
well-being. One study found that:
mothers jeopardized their own health and well-being when trying to provide
for their families by taking on second, third, and fourth jobs, working odd
hours, or commuting long distances via public transportation. Moreover, in
order to acquire and maintain affordable housing, many families were
forced to live in unsafe neighborhoods. And finally, mothers with young
children consistently had trouble securing stable care for their children. 41

Non-entrants also tend to miss opportunities to collect other, less
stigmatizing forms of public assistance, such as food stamps and
medical assistance. Even TANF recipients can suffer material
deprivations when they are sanctioned or terminated for failing to
provide requested information or when newborns are denied assistance
as a result of family cap policies.
Finally, mandatory child support cooperation policies can result in
42
the unintentional perpetuation of domestic violence. Battered women
43
are overrepresented in the TANF population. To reduce the dangers
of exacerbating domestic violence through reporting requirements,
TANF attempts to protect victims by allowing states to grant these
victims an exemption from the cooperation requirement. 44 Yet many
eligible women are not claiming the exemption for a variety of
reasons, including caseworker failure to advise women of the
exemption, a lack of training by social service workers, the public
setting of the welfare office, fear that child welfare authorities may
take their children, stringent requirements for independent
corroboration, and feelings of humiliation and embarrassment. 45 The
paternity disclosure required by the child support system poses a
substantial risk to domestic violence victims, for very little benefit.
After all, these mothers do not get any child support checks that are
collected; rather, the state keeps the money to repay itself for the costs

40Id. at 47-48.
41 Id. at 48.
42 See Susan Notar & Vicki Turetsky, Models for Safe Child Support Enforcement, 8 AM.
U. J. GENDER Soc. POL'y & L. 657, 664 (2000).
43 See Anna Marie Smith, supra note 32, at 153-54 (although batterers come from all
social classes, TANF clients are especially vulnerable because they have fewer economic
supports).
44 See 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7)(A)(iii) (2000).
State implementation varies widely, and
most state policies are not adequate to protect battered women. See Anna Marie Smith, supra
note 32, at 158.
45 See Anna Marie Smith, supra note 32, at 165-66; see also Notar and Turetsky, supra
note 42, at 672-76.
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46

of welfare. Notably, TANF recipients lack the decisional autonomy
of non-poor single mothers, who are "not forced to identify, marry,
live with, seek support from, or interact with the biological father. ,,47
Welfare privacy invasions might be tolerable if there were
substantial, countervailing justifications. The primary justification is
fraud prevention. It is impossible to survive on welfare benefits (the
average monthly benefit for a family of three is $363),48 so many
welfare applicants accept support from family members or earn
additional income from jobs such as babysitting or cutting hair - and
49
suffer dire hardship nonetheless. The state forces welfare mothers to
earn unreported income to provide for their children, but declares this
conduct as "fraud." Still, fraud is grossly overstated in welfare
programs, and studies suggest it is at the same levels as other
government programs. 50 Even purveyors of electronic fraud detection
systems have admitted that fraud is extremely rare. 51 Accordingly, the
true reason for these policies is to control and stigmatize poor women.

II.

LAW

Our most disadvantaged citizens have long had less privacy than
their wealthier counterparts. As a constitutional matter, the poor have
fewer protections under the Fourth Amendment, which protects
reasonable expectations of privacy from warrantless government
searches and seizures.
People who live in crowded, urban
neighborhoods and who cannot afford "a freestanding home, fences,
46 See Daniel L. Hatcher, Child Support Harming Children: Subordinating the Best
interests of Children to the Fiscal interests of the State, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1029, 1045
(2007).
47 See Anna Marie Smith, supra note 32, at 140. Non-welfare families can use child
support enforcement services, but they can withdraw on a voluntary basis. See Notar &
Turetsky, supra note 42, at 671.
48 DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, ADMINISTRATION ON CHILDREN AND FAMILIES,
SEVENTH ANNUAL REpORT TO CONGRESS, at 75 (2006).
49 See GILLIaM, supra note 8, at 67, 100. See also KATHRYN EDIN & LAURA LEIN,
MAKING ENDS MEET: How SINGLE MOTHERS SURVIVE WELFARE AND LOW-WAGE WORK
(1997).
50 See Mulzer, supra note 10, at 688-89 ("[f]ear of fraud has always played a larger role in
the administration of public benefits programs than it realistically should have."); see also
Julilly Kohler Hausman, "The Crime of Survival": Fraud Prosecutions, Community
Surveillance, and the Original "Welfare Queen, "41 J. SOC. HIST. 329, 343 (2007) ("Much of
what became defined as fraud were simply attempts to supplement welfare grants with
additional income from low wage work or living with another wage earner.").
51 See, e.g., Joshua Dean, Texas Nears Rollout of Fingerprint System, FED. COMPUTER
WEEK, Aug. 5, 1999, available at http://www.fcw.comlprintl5_150/news/61522-l.html
(official from private contractor states that out of 700,000 people fingerprinted for public
benefits, twelve cases were referred for further investigation).
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[and] lawns," have a lowered expectation of privacy and are thus more
likely to suffer unregulated intrusions by government agents. 52 In
addition to these class distinctions, welfare mothers bear the brunt of
sexist and racist assumptions that courts use to justify state
surveillance.

A. Home Visits
In 1971, the Supreme Court upheld home VISItS by welfare
officials in Wyman v. James, reasoning that the visits were not
searches covered by the Fourth Amendment because they were
consensual. 53 Moreover, even if they were searches, they were
reasonable, given the state's interest in deterring fraud, the need to
protect the children of welfare mothers, the rehabilitative purpose of
the searches, and the lack of criminal consequences. 54 In finding that
the privacy deprivations posed by home visits were negligible, the
Wyman Court disregarded affidavits from twelve aid recipients
alleging that the unannounced visits were not only embarrassing when
guests were in the home, but also when personal questions were asked
in front of children. 55 In silencing the voices of poor women, the Court
ignored the social context in which they live and mistakenly equated
forced consent with free choice.
The Court also expressed its distaste for Ms. James, the plaintiff,
and how she ran her household. The Court disliked her "attitude,"
"evasiveness," and "belligerency" - all of which arose from her
resistance to the state and her entirely reasonable belief that the state
could verify her eligibility through personal interviews and
documents. 56 Her request was simply to be treated the same as other
beneficiaries of governmental largesse. As Justice Douglas bitterly
remarked in dissent, "No such sums are spent policing the government
subsidies granted to farmers, airlines, steamship companies, and junk
mail dealers, to name but a few.,,57 The Wyman Court also intimated,
based on Ms. James' social services casefile (and not evidence
adduced at trial), that Ms. James' son had been physically abused and
bitten by rats, concluding that "[ t ]he picture is a sad and unhappy

52 Christopher Slobogin, The Poverty Exception to the Fourth Amendment, 55
REv. 391,401-05 (2003).
53 400 U.S. 309, 317-18 (1971).
54Id. at 318-24.
55 Id. at 321 n.8.
56/d. at 322 n.9.
57Id. at 332 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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one.,,58 The Court's clear assumption was that poor, single women are
terrible mothers who warrant suspicion and distrust. The end result
was that privacy is "dependent on the poverty or affluence of the
beneficiary,,59 - a result at odds with the Fourth Amendment, or any
concept of fair and equal treatment. In a post-TANF case, the Ninth
Circuit upheld Wyman, refusing to recognize differences between
AFDC and TANF or to apply post-Wyman jurisprudence significantly
60
limiting suspicionless searches. Instead, the court in Sanchez v. San
Diego expressly lumped welfare mothers with criminals on probation
and concluded that neither group has a reasonable expectation to
•
61
pnvacy.
B. Drug Tests

Welfare recipients have fared better in challenging state-mandated
2
drug testing, which is expressly authorized in TANF/ although the
victory is tenuous. In Marchwinski v. Howard, the district court, in a
controlling opinion,63 struck down a Michigan law authorizing
suspicionless drug testing of TANF applicants. Although the State's
professed need to address substance abuse as a barrier to employment
is "laudable and understandable," it was not a public safety issue and
thus, did not justify dispensing with the ordinary Fourth Amendment
64
The court rejected the
requirement of individualized suspicion.
state's argument that a "special need" arose from its interest in
protecting children from drug abusing parents, explaining that TANF
is not directed at child abuse or neglect. 65 Thus, the TANF program
"cannot be used to regulate the parents in a manner that erodes their
privacy rights in order to further goals that are unrelated to the [Family
Independence Program].,,66 In so holding, the district court refused to
allow governmental assistance to become an unlimited tool for social
control. The decision thus reflects a feminist understanding of the
power imbalances between the state and poor women, as well as the
581d. at 322 n.9.
591d. at 332 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
60 San Diego v. Sanchez, 464 F.3d 916 (9th Cir. 2006), reh'g denied en bane, 483 F.3d
965 (2007).
61 ld. at 927.
62
21 U.S.C. § 862(b)(2001).
63 113 F. Supp. 2d 1134 (E.D. Mich. 2000). The decision was overturned by the Sixth
Circuit, 309 F.3d 330 (6th Cir. 2002), but subsequently an en banc panel split evenly on the
issue, 319 F.3d 258 (6th Cir. 2003). Under Sixth Circuit rules, the split resulted in an
affirmance of the district court's opinion. 60 Fed. App'x 601 (6th Cir. 2003).
64 113 F. Supp. 2d at 1140.
65 ld. at 1142.
66 d.
1
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state's singling out of poor women as compared to other citizens.
Still, state legislatures have expressed a renewed interest in drug
testing,67 and are bolstered by the Sixth Circuit's opinion that welfare
mothers have a diminished expectation of privacy because "welfare
assistance is a very heavily regulated area of public life. ,,68
C. Decisional Privacy

The Supreme Court has long held that individual decisions relating
to childbearing and the raising of children are fundamental rights that
69
cannot be abridged without a compelling state interest. However, the
Supreme Court has also held that the government has no duty to
subsidize the exercise of these rights. 70 As the Court has explained,
"[t]he Due Process Clauses generally confer no affirmative right to
governmental aid, even where such aid may be necessary to secure
life, liberty, or property interests of which the government itself may
not deprive the individual.,,71 Further, the Supreme Court has held that
the poor are not a suspect class under the Equal Protection Clause, and
thus, statutory classifications that fall more harshly on the poor are
subject only to rational basis review.72 There is an unavoidable tension
between advocating for privacy along with assistance for poor women.
"Choice rhetoric within the privacy doctrine can often operate in
diametric opposition to the reproductive needs of poor women.,,73
The Court's holdings have drastic implications for poor women.
Even though they have a right to an abortion, the government has no
67 See, e.g., Chris L. Jenkins, Bill Would Require Some to Pass Drug Test to Get Aid,
WASH. POST, Feb. 19,2008, at B5 (discussing proposed bill in Virginia, as well as efforts in
Kentucky and Arizona).
68 Id. at 337. Cj Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001) (hospital policy of
conducting urine tests of mostly poor, pregnant women for referral to state prosecutors
constituted unreasonable searches).
69 See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
§§ 10.2.4, 10.3 (right to control upbringing of children and reproductive autonomy,
respectively) (3rd ed. 2006).
70 Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (government does not violate Equal Protection by
failing to fund abortions, even though it pays for childbirth); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297
(1980) (upholding the Hyde Amendment, which prohibited the use of federal fund for
performing abortions except where the mother's life was endangered or in cases of rape or
incest that had been reported promptly to law enforcement).
71 Webster v. Reproductive Health Serv., 492 U.S. 490,491 (1989) (citing DeShaney v.
Winnebago County Dept. of Social Serv., 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989».
72 See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (upholding a state law that capped
welfare benefits to families regardless of their size). The Court stated, "the Constitution does
not empower this Court to second-guess state officials charged with the difficult responsibility
of allocating limited public welfare funds among the myriad of potential recipients." /d. at
487.
73 Bridgewater, supra note 34, at 407-08.
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duty to provide them with financial assistance if they cannot afford to
exercise this right. 74 Likewise, even though welfare mothers have the
right to bear additional children, the government has no duty to
75
Courts
subsidize that choice with additional welfare benefits.
upholding family cap policies have blithely accepted legislative
determinations that the caps give welfare mothers an incentive to work
and to have fewer children - even though empirical studies have
76
shown no basis for either assumption.

D. Privacy Laws
The Privacy Act of 1974 is the primary statute regulating how
77
federal government agencies manage information about individuals.
In 1998, the Act was extended to "computer matching," which occurs
when federal and state agencies compare data about individuals. 78 As
described above, TANF applicants are subject to extensive computer
matching. The Privacy Act requires, among other things, that
individuals subject to matching have opportunities to receive notice
and to refute adverse information when benefits are denied or
terminated. 79 As a result, when an applicant applies for TANF, she
should receive notice that the state agency may be obtaining and
matching federal records to verify her eligibility information.
The Act's protections are detailed and elaborate, but offer limited
shelter for welfare applicants. To begin with, the Privacy Act is
focused on protecting information from governmental misuse once it
is gathered. It does not focus on the methods or forms of collection,
which in the welfare system are purposefully demeaning and
stigmatizing. Further, the Act's requirements of notice and consent
are generally meaningless, because on welfare applications these
See cases cited in n.70.
See, e.g., Dandridge, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (upholding Maryland's maximum grant
provision under AFDC against challenge that it violated Equal Protection); C.K. v. New
Jersey Dept. of Health & Hum. Servs., 92 F.3d 171 (1996) (upholding New Jersey's family
cap ~olicy against arguments the policy was arbitrary and capricious and unconstitutional).
6 See Rebekah Smith, supra note 33, at 156-62, 187-88 (debunking the myths that
underlie family cap policies).
77 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2001). American privacy law is a complex patchwork of federal,
state, and local laws that have developed in a piecemeal, rather than comprehensive, fashion, .
as well as constitutional provisions and common law protections. See DANIEL J. So LOVE ,
PRIVACY, INFORMATION, AND TECHNOLOGY 225-29 (Aspen 2006).
78 The Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-503
amended the Privacy Act to add several new provisions. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(8)-(l3),
(e)(l2), (0), (P), (q), (r), (u) (2000).
79 See Brown, supra note 25, at 428-29 (describing requirements of Privacy Act as they
apply to TANF applicants). Brown also discusses important privacy issues surrounding
immigration status. !d. at 430-32.
74
75
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provisions are usually jargon filled, difficult to understand, and hidden
among the reams of information and questions contained in the
80
forms. Finally, the Privacy Act does not govern the massive amounts
of personal information held by state and local agencies, and statutory
protections at this level diverge widely. 81
Ill.

FEMINISM AND PRIVACY

Second-wave feminists focused on privacy because they identified
a pUblic/private divide in society and law that perpetuated gender
inequality. 82 By contrast, third-wave feminists do not debate privacy.
To the contrary, they eagerly shed privacy in pursuit of consciousnessraising and personal liberation. Whereas second-wave feminists
viewed the personal as political, third-wave feminists see the personal
as public. This part explains how the two waves differ and what their
perspectives on privacy mean for welfare mothers.
A. Second Wave Feminism

Second-wave feminists attacked the physical privacy and the
boundary between public and private that legal systems and social
83
norms historically upheld. In the traditional view, the public domain
was the world of work and politics, where men dominated and women
84
were excluded. By contrast, the private domain was that of home and
family, where autonomous individuals lived free from state
85
interference. However, feminists made clear that autonomy within
families extended only to men, who were free to dominate women and
children because of their dependence on men for social goods. 86 In
turn, this led to the abuse of women within the home and the
87
concomitant failure of the state to intervene. Felilinists rejected the
view that the government's hands-off approach was neutral, because
Jd. at 428.
Jd.
82 See Tracy E. Higgins, Reviving the Public/Private Distinction in Feminist Theorizing,
75 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 847,847 (2000).
83 See Martha A. Ackelsberg & Mary Lyndon Shanley, Privacy, Publicity, and Power: A
80

81

Feminist Rethinking of the Public-Private Distinction, in REVISIONING THE POLITICAL,
FEMINIST RECONSTRUCTIONS OF TRADITIONAL CONCEPTS IN WESTERN POLITICAL THEORY 213,
217-20 (1996).
84 See Suzanne A. Kim, Reconstructing Family Privacy, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 557, 568 (2006)
(summarizing the pUblic-private dichotomy).
85 Jd. at 568-69.
86 See Higgins, supra note 82, at 850-51.
87 See Reva B. Siegel, The Rule of Love: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105
YALE L.J. 2117, 2118 (1996); see also SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE
FAMILY 128-29 (1989).
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the state set the legal ground rules that permitted private inequality to
88
Moreover, feminists argued that the idea of
flourish unchecked.
autonomy was a myth for women; they were enmeshed within family
relationships of dependency and attachment. 89 Catherine MacKinnon
raised a radical critique of privacy, arguing that privacy could never be
a basis for claiming rights because it is a tool of gender subordination
90
that leaves men alone to oppress women one at a time. The feminist
critique of the public/private divide had powerful repercussions. For
instance, the state today criminalizes domestic violence and provides
legal recourse for women demanding equal treatment In the
91
workplace.
The second-wave cntIque, however, is largely based on the
experiences of white, middle-class women. It ignores differences of
class and race, particularly the experiences of poor, African-American
women, who have historically lacked privacy. 92 During slavery,
society denied African-American women privacy by expropriating
"their labor, sexuality, and reproductive capacity" and treating their
bodies "as items of public . . . display.,,93 Post-slavery, the state
coerced poor black women into sterilization, disproportionately
removed black children from their homes through the child welfare

88 See Frances Olson, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform,
96 HARV. L. REv. 1497, 1502, 1506-10 (1983); OKIN, supra note 87, at Ill.
89 See generally MARTHA FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMIL Y 186-89
(1995); Robin West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological
Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, 3 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 81, 84 (1987); Robin West,
Juri~rudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 (1988).
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 194 (1989).
Further, she argued that privacy obscures women's lack of choice and consent within the
private realm, and, by isolating women, it obscures "women's shared experience." Id.
91 See ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND FEMINIST LAWMAKING 4-5
(2000). At the same time, engagement with the state to combat domestic violence has costs;
the state often reflects and enforces patriarchal norms and state enforcement limits women's
autonomy. Id. at 181-98 (describing tensions inherent in the criminalization of domestic
violence).
92 See Jennifer C. Nash, From Lavender to Purple: Privacy, Black Women, and Feminist
Legal Theory, 11 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 303, 319 (2005) ("because the black female body is
inscribed and engraved with particular gendered and racialized cultural meanings, the black
female subject has never been granted the same kind of privacy as the white female, the
privacy that some feminists have argued needs to be 'exploded. "'); see also ANITA L. ALLEN,
UNEASY ACCESS: PRIVACY FOR WOMEN IN A FREE SOCIETY 61 (1988) ("It is plain that in the
United States domestic privacy is a virtual commodity purchased by the middle class and the
well-to-do.").
93 Linda C. McClain, Reconstructive Tasksfor a Liberal Feminist Conception of Privacy,
40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 759, 770 (1999); see also Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug
Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, And the Right 10 Privacy, 104 HARV. L.
REv. 1419,1437-40 (1991).
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system, and criminally prosecuted black, drug-addicted mothers.
Although African-Americans have always been a minority of welfare
. recipients, welfare has been debated in racial terms and "viewed as a
program benefiting black women. ,,95 As a result, welfare history is
replete with state intrusions into the homes and bodies of the poor,
such as through home raids, drug tests, and forced sterilizations. Thus,
for poor, minority women, privacy in the home can offer a refuge from
96
the oppression and racism of the outside world.
The second-wave critique also downplayed certain positive liberal
values associated with privacy. In response, liberal feminists such as
Anita Allen and Linda McClain have stood up for privacy, unwilling
to "toss out the baby . . . with the bath water.,,97 These liberal
feminists acknowledge the harms done to women under cover of
"privacy,,,98 but contend that a reconceived notion of the public/private
divide can be valuable for women both as a descriptive tool and
normative goal. Privacy is essential to moral personhood and selfdevelopment;99 without privacy, women's lives contain a
"disproportionate burden for domestic labor, child care, and lack of
leisure and time."loo Following liberal tradition, their argument is that
women "should be permitted to live out their disparate,
nonconforming preferences," and that privacy is essential to achieve
this good because it gives individuals space to develop and carry out
their own ends. 101
Tracy Higgins adds that the private/public
distinction can capture important differences between harms that the
state inflicts versus harms inflicted by private parties. While both
harms must be taken seriously, they can require different responses. 102
As Dorothy Roberts points out, for African-American women, the
state typically poses a greater risk of oppression than does private
103
power.

See Roberts, supra note 93, at 1440-50.
See PREMILLA NADASEN, WELFARE WARRIORS: THE WELFARE RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN
THE UNITED STATES xvi (2005).
96 Roberts, supra note 93, at 1470-71. Indeed, "family often provided some of the few
comforts poor and working class black families could enjoy." NADASEN, supra note 17, at
237.
97 ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS, supra note 92, at 71,81; see also McClain, supra note 93, at
765.
98 See ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS, supra note 92, at 70; McClain, supra note 93, at 776.
99 See ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS, supra note 92, at 36.
100 McClain, supra note 93, at 783.
101 ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS, supra note 92, at 86-87.
102 See Higgins, supra note 82, at 863.
103 See Roberts, supra note 93, at 1471.
94
95
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Martha Fineman, whose influential work focuses on how law and
society ignore familial relationships of dependency, has also called for
reinvigorating common law notions of family oPrivacy that would
blanket single mothers and children as entities. I While traditional
families are deemed private, poor mothers are treated by the state as
"public," because they are seen as deviant and dangerous for reJecting
patriarchal sexual affiliation as the sole definition of family.1O As a
result, the state justifies "regulation, supervision, and control" of poor,
single mothers. 106 Although most feminists have abandoned the
private sphere ideology, and for good reason, Fineman notes that the
ideology "nonetheless has established the concept of the desirability of
a family or private space into which the state, absent compelling
reasons, is not free to intrude.,,107 Still, she is pessimistic that we can
re-imagine family privacy without "its patriarchal baggage."I08
The welfare rights movement demonstrates the intractability of this
baggage. In the 1960s, a vibrant welfare rights movement flourished
in which poor black women, building upon the civil rights and
feminist struggles, asserted their political and economic rights. 109
Through organizing, political protests, and litigation, the welfare rights
movement achieved many of its goals, including objective eligibility
criteria rather than discretionary morals tests, higher monthly AFDC
benefits, fair hearing rights to appeal adverse welfare decisions,
elimination of restrictive residency laws, and a voice within public
policy. The movement challenged the two-parent family as the norm
and highlighted the economic and social value provided by domestic
110
work, thus embodying feminist insights.
Most importantly, the
movement empowered poor women to demand rights.
Yet despite these substantial achievements, the welfare rights
movement never secured privacy for poor women/II and the
movement ultimately dissolved due to financial constraints, staff
conflicts, and public backlash. Welfare mothers remained the targets
of public hostility and distrust, and many gains were undermined by
TANF, which reinserted discretion into the welfare bureaucracy. 112
104 FINEMAN, supra note 9, at 186-89.
105Id. at 106-18, 189.
106 Id. at 190.
107 Id. at 188.
108 I d.
109 NADASEN, supra note 17, at xiv.
110 Id. at 232.
111 See Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
112 See generally Matthew Diller, The Revolution in Welfare Administration: Rules,
Discretion, and Entrepreneurial Government, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1121 (2000).
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Still, the enactment of TANF has spurred new pockets of activism on
the local level, which may contain the seeds for a more sustained
claim to privacy.113 For instance, the Mothers for Justice, an activist
group of low-income women in New Haven, Connecticut organized
against many TANF reforms, including fingerprinting. Through a
direct action campaign, they confronted state leaders and expressed
their outrage over the policy. 114 The policy, however, remained.
In addition to physical privacy, second-wave feminists also
considered decisional privacy, in the context of reproductive rights. In
Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court based the constitutional right to
abortion on privacy, which is "implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty," and contained within the "penumbras" of the Constitution,
even if not found in the text of the Constitution itself. liS Yet for poor
women, this privacy "right" can be illusory if they lack the resources
to exercise it. As Catharine MacKinnon has argued, the Supreme
Court's equation of privacy with state non-intervention, or privacy as a
negative liberty, means that poor women can constitutionally be
denied Medicaid coverage for abortions. 116 Further, poor women are
disproportionately impacted by restrictions on abortion, such as
waiting periods and hospitalization requirements, because these
restrictions make the choice of abortion more expensive and time. 117
consummg.
Accordingly, many scholars have argued that reproductive rights
should be founded on equal protection, rather than privacy, because
equality analysis better captures how lack of reproductive choice
permanently subordinates women, and only women, as a class. liS Still,
it is not clear that reproductive rights can be defended without some
conception of privacy. Privacy allows women space to reflect and
113 See NADASEN, supra note 17, at 241; see also Mothers for Justice & Giovanna Shay,
The Phenomenal Women of Mothers for Justice, 8 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 193 (1996). This

groundbreaking article shares the voices and experiences of welfare mothers in New Haven as
they confronted TANF reforms.
114 See NADASEN, supra note 17, at 236-38.
liS 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973). Even under Roe, much of the decisional power is left in the
hands of the doctor, rather than the woman. See Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the
Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 955, 1020 (1984) ("A privacy right that demands that 'the
abortion decision . . . be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman's attending
physician,' gives doctors undue power by falsely casting the abortion decision as primarily a
medical question.") (quoting Roe, 410 U.S. at 164).
116 CATHARINE MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 190-92 (1989).
117 See Walter Dellinger & Gene B. Sperling, Abortion and the Supreme Court: The
Retreatfrom Roe v. Wade, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 83, 102 (1989).
liS See generally Sylvia Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 955
(1984).
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deliberate on moral choices. 119 This sort of deliberation "is necessary
to the development and expression of personhood and personality,
including the freedom to exercise moral responsibility.,,120 Moreover,
reproductive choice is not only a matter of decisional privacy, but also
leads to more spatial privacy, because women who choose to limit
childbearing do not face the privacy losses associated with
motherhood. 121
In sum, second-wave feminists established that women have had
too much unwanted privacy, but can greatly benefit from certain forms
of privacy. 122 However, in their focus on domestic violence, workplace
equality, and reproductive choice, second-wave feminists did not
address the unique privacy intrusions faced by welfare mothers, which
continue unabated - even now that welfare recipients are working.
Nor did the second-wave acknowledge that poor women have less
privacy than other women and that this shortfall results largely from
the intersection of gender with class and race. In advocating for
decisional privacy, the feminist agenda did not confront other
reproductive choice issues that particularly impacted low-income,
123
black women, such as forced sterilization.
Moreover, the second-wave emphasis on autonomy and individual
self-control may have intensified public animosity against welfare
mothers, because it reinforced perceptions that welfare mothers make
124
irresponsible choices not to work and to bear too many children.
Mainstream feminists have not mobilized against this privatization of
poverty, i.e., the idea that individual choices alone cause poverty.
Indeed, feminists were largely ineffective during the passage of
125
TANF.
TANF's emphasis on personal responsibility privatizes the
causes of poverty by blaming women for their economic status, rather
than acknowledging the complex intersection of the economic, social,
and demographic forces that produce poverty. 126 As a result, TANF's
119 See Stephen J. Schnably, Beyond Griswold: Foucauldian and Republican Approaches
to Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REV. 861,932-34 (1991).
120 Linda C. McClain, The Poverty of Privacy, 3 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 119, 126 (1992).
121 See ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS, supra note 92, at 100 ("Lives spent bearing and rearing
children and without adequate solitude and seclusion from others are stunted lives.").
122 See ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS, supra note 92, at 37. There are other critiques of the
second-wave view of privacy. For instance, Robin West offers an alternate view of privacy
that considers women's experience, including connection, dependence, and caring.
123 See NADASEN, supra note 17, at 213-19.
124 !d. at 196.
125 I d. at 219-22.
126 See Michele Gilman, Poverty and Communitarianism: Toward a Community-Based
Welfare System, 66 U. PIIT. L. REV. 721, 745-50 (2005).
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emphasis on work makes poor relief a matter of personal initiative, but
the law fails to provide adequate supports that make life above the
poverty line possible, such as child care, transportation, training and
education, and a living wage. 127 Further, TANF's emphasis on
"personal responsibility" rejects communal accountability or collective
solutions for income inequality. The end result is ironic. The state has
deemed poverty a matter of private choice, but has simultaneously
denied the poor the privacy and concomitant dignity that could
actually lead to increased self-sufficiency. Women who are materially
deprived, psychologically damaged, or physically abused are unlikely
to gain a footing for self-sufficiency. Is third-wave feminism better
situated to defend privacy?
B. Third-Wave Feminism

Third-wave feminism is not a uniform movement, but rather an
emerging and evolving assemblage of feminist voices defining
themselves against the second-wave movement. It began as a dialogue
by a generation of "daughters" who grew up with the benefits of
second-wave feminism, reacting to the feminism of their "mothers. ,,128
Third-wave feminists have particularly criticized the second-wave for
failing to recognize the diversity in the lives of women and for linking
sex to oppression. 129 The third-wave is generally marked by its
confessional, narrative approach; its emphasis on sexual empowerment
and liberation; its anti-essentialist perspective; and its embrace of
130
technology as a tool of the movement.
Whereas second-wave
feminists fought patriarchy from a unified political front, third-wave
131
They are focused less on
feminists are not overtly politica1.
127

Id. at 742-44 (describing lack of work supports under TANF).

128

It is rooted in criticism by women of color of the white women's feminist movement.

See LESLIE HEYWOOD & JENNIFER DRAKE, Introduction, to THIRD-WAVE AGENDA: BEING
FEMINIST, DOING FEMINISM 8 (Leslie Heywood and Jennifer Drake eds. 1997). Bell hooks has
stated that "the focus on feminism as a way to develop shared identity and community has
little appeal to women who experience community, who seek ways to end exploitation and
oppression in the context of their lives." Jd. at 12 (quoting BELL HOOKS, FEMINIST THEORY:
FROM MARGIN TO CENTER 28 (1984)).
129 Second-wave feminists reject this characterization of their movement.
See Gloria
Steinem, Forward to REBECCA WALKER, To BE REAL: TELLING THE TRUTH AND CHANGING
THE FACE OF FEMINISM (1995). Steinem writes, "[I] want to remind readers who are younger
or otherwise new to feminism that some tactical and theoretical wheels don't have to be
reinvented." Jd. at xix.
130 The third-wave movement is summarized in Bridget 1. Crawford, Toward a Third-

Wave Feminist Legal Theory: Young Women, Pornography and the Praxis of Pleasure, 14
MICH. J. GENDER & L. 99,116, 122-24 (2007).
13l See HEYWOOD & DRAKE, supra note 128, at 3 ("[W]e define feminism's third-wave as
a movement that contains elements of second wave critique of beauty culture, sexual abuse,
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collective revolution, and more on personal evolution. 132 Third-wave
feminism offers both promise and peril for the privacy rights of poor
women.
The potential of third-wave feminism lies primarily in its antiessentialist approach. Second-wave feminists tended to adopt an
essentialist perspective that viewed inequity through a gender prism
that assumed a white, middle-class viewpoint. By contrast, third-wave
feminists are inclusive and celebratory of the diversity among women
- race, culture, class, sexual orientation, disability, geography, and
religion - and the multiple identities women bear.l33 They invite new
voices to join feminist debates, and they seek to raise the feminist
consciousness of all women.
One former Chicana welfare mother, Maria Cristina Rangel, writes
movingly in a third-wave anthology of her harried and stressful
attempts to work, care for her children, and attend college on a
134
She ruefully counts herself lucky to have
scholarship from Smith.
applied for public assistance in the waning days of AFDC, because
TANF does not allow college attendance to count as a work activity. 135
She describes how, at each recertification meeting, "I had to explain
myself over and over again, always living with the fear that I would
not be believed and my benefits would be cut as a result.,,136 Then,
"[a]fter each humiliating, intimidating interrogation," she would have
to make her way out through the waiting room with its patronizing
posters exhorting, "Mommy, will we always be on Welfare?" and
137
"Work Works!"
Frustrated by the abuses of the welfare system,
Rangel formed an Association of Low Income Students to address
138
issues surrounding poverty and class on campus and beyond. Hers is
a rare voice in any wave of feminist writing. 139 As she notes, she had
advantages that other welfare mothers often lack, she spoke English
and power structures while it also acknowledges and makes use of the pleasure, danger, and
defining power of those structures.").
132 Alternatively, their idea of revolution is a non-political one. As one writer states, "My
body is . . . beautiful, and every time I look in the mirror and acknowledge that, I am
contributing to the revolution." Nony Lamm, It's a Big Fat Revolution, in LISTEN UP, supra
note I, at 133.
l33 See. e.g., the collected essays in LISTEN UP, supra note I. For instance, Sonja D.
Curry-Johnson writes, "As an educated, married, monogamous, feminist, Christian, AfiicanAmerican mother, I suffer from an acute case of multiplicity." Id. at 51-52.
134 See Rangel, supra note I, at 188-96.
135 Id. at 190.
136 Id. at 191.
I37 Id.
138 I d. at 193.
139 But see Mothers for Justice & Shay, supra note 113.
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and had access to a four year college education. As a result, "I think
about all the other stories that are not heard, all the other injustices that
remain unresolved. ,,140
Those stories remain largely untold. Despite the open arms of the
third-wavers, most welfare mothers will not receive the invitation.
Third-wave feminist thought is widely disseminated through online
sources such as webzines, videos, alternative music, and blogs,141 but
these fora are not easily accessible if a woman does not have a
computer or technological know-how.
Even with access to
technology, welfare mothers might find that the middle-class concerns
that permeate most third-wave writing does not speak to them.
Further, in popular culture, third-wave feminism manifests in images
of sexually liberated women such as the Pussycat Dolls and the
professional quartet frolicking in Sex and the City. These are women
who link their sexuality to power and who do not have to fight the
battles of earlier feminists. While these glamorous commercial images
do not reflect real life for any women, they are particularly removed
from the messages the welfare system sends to its beneficiaries.
Moreover, third-wave feminism is not yet about political
activism. 142 The movement has produced a 13-point Manifesta that
contains some goals that relate to poor women, including safeguarding
the right to bear or not to bear children regardless of impoverishment;
equal access to health care; and a living wage that would bring
143
workers over the poverty line. However, activism among third-wave
feminists is oriented more towards community action and engagement
with non-profits than political activism and social reform. For
instance, Manifesta highlights the efforts of Dressed for Success, a
non-profit that provides professional clothes for welfare women who
l44
are transitioning to work.
This is a valuable initiative, but it
reinforces, rather than challenges, the norms of the welfare system.
At bottom, the current third-wave movement is not about privacy.
It is about public confession and open expression. Third-wavers
assume that throwing off the mantle of privacy is a freely directed
choice by a liberated woman, or at least a positive step toward
claiming autonomy. If anything, the pendulum has swung so far away
See Rangel, supra note 1, at 194.
See Crawford, supra note 6, at 127-29.
142 The "[kley sites of struggle" are cultural production and sexual politics. See Heywood
& Drake, supra note 128, at 4.
143 JENNIFER BAUMGARDNER & AMy RICHARDS, MANIFESTA: YOUNG WOMEN, FEMINISM,
AND THE FUTURE 278-81 (2000).
144 Id. at 292.
140
141
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from valuing privacy, that Anita Allen has suggested a possible need
to coerce privacy to retain liberal values of "human dignity,
personhood, moral autonomy, workable community life, and tolerant
democratic political and legal institutions. ,,145
Describing the
phenomenon of the Jenni cam, in which a young woman voluntarily
broadcast her entire life over the internet, Allen reflects, "women first
reconstructed privacy by rejecting outmoded conceptions of
domesticity, modesty, reserve, and subordination to men; now they
reconstruct privacy by exploiting it for income, celebrity, or both.,,146
She claims that while she is "not suggesting that Jenni should tum off
her camera and sweep floors for her boyfriend," she should, "tum off
her camera so that, free from the gaze of others, she can live a more
genuinely expressive and independent life.,,147 By contrast, welfare
mothers have not chosen to give up privacy as do the Jennis of the
third-wave; it is stolen from them. While Jennis' sexual freedom is
celebrated; the sexuality of welfare mothers is demonized. Jenni can
exploit the private in public without any state regulation; welfare
mothers live under the gaze of the state. In sum, the third-wave
welcomes the diverse stories and experiences of welfare mothers, but
lacks the theoretical framework to deal with privacy deprivations.
N. CONCLUSION

Despite inadequate economic or social support, welfare mothers
have moved into the workplace and accomplished what society has
asked of them. Nevertheless, they face the same level of privacy
intrusions that have historically been used against them. A rightsbased litigation tactic has staved off drug testing by the narrowest of
margins, but leaves untouched the larger administrative apparatus of
investigation and surveillance. The welfare system continues to use
privacy intrusions as a method for imposing stigma and judgment on
vulnerable women. This failure raises the issue of strategy. Secondwave feminists disagreed over whether rights-based rhetoric is an
appropriate scaffold for achieving justice. 148 On the one hand, many
feminists feel that fighting for rights, such as a "right to privacy,"
forces women to advocate within a male framework that is
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individualistic and liberal, resulting only in marginal gains within a
patriarchal system. Furthermore, in many ways, welfare mothers are
so oppressed by the welfare bureaucracy that they "are almost the
inverse of the rights-bearing individual who would rise up against
surveillance with a legal challenge.,,149 On the other hand, some
feminists contend that obtaining rights can lead to tangible
improvements in women's lives and serve as a starting point for
changing societal expectations of women's potential and reality. 150
The welfare rights movement reveals truths for both perspectives. 151
Given the entrenched nature of welfare's privacy-stripping
practices, a multi-faceted approach is needed to enhance the privacy of
poor women. Some important rights are already on the books, such as
the exemption for domestic violence victims within the child support
enforcement program, and these laws need better enforcement and
caseworker training. Other laws and regulations, such as those
requiring home visits, should be the subject of legal reform through
both courts and lawmaking bodies. Advocates need to change the
rhetoric surrounding welfare and move it away from individual blame
towards collective responsibility. Welfare recipients are working, and
thus embody mainstream American values. Certainly, middle-class
Americans would recoil in horror if the government put them through
similar scrutiny as a condition of receiving valuable governmental
subsidies, such as tax deductions for mortgages and retirement plans,
and childcare tax credits. 152 Accordingly, advocates can make
equality-based arguments, which can enhance the privacy framework
by putting a communal gloss on issues of individual dignity. While all
Americans face deteriorating privacy as a result of new technologies,
no other group of Americans suffers the same forms of stigma when
receiving governmental assistance. Still other welfare practices are
matters of bureaucratic compulsion, and thus advocates and welfare
clients need to make the case to welfare administrators that stripping
welfare clients of their dignity is contrary to the goals of selfsufficiency mandated by TANF.
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This symposium asks, Can You Hear Us Now? The idea of being
heard presumes a conscious choice to throw off privacy to shout into
the public square. Welfare mothers do not have a meaningful choice
to keep the personal private. Their private lives are public fodder for
social control tactics that tout self-sufficiency while undermining
actual opportunities for independence. Moreover, feminism has not
included poor women within the "Us," that is presumed in this
question. Too often, the voices of poor women, including their
perspectives on how the intersectionality of gender, class, and race
shapes their lives - have been muted in both second-wave and thirdwave feminism. Further, a third-wave feminist might rightly take
issue with the notion of an "Us" voicing a unified message. There is
no monolithic feminist movement; we are united only in our shared
commitment to defeat inequality. At the same time, the multiplicity of .
feminist identities should not become so splintering that we cannot
find common grounds for a shared fight. Welfare mothers need each
other, as well as concerned feminists everywhere, to fight for
economic justice and insulation from state surveillance. Thus, this
paper asks a different question, "Can You Hear Us Fight For The
Privacy and Dignity of All Women?"

